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Fiscal Restraints Trump Due Process:
Children's Diminishing Right to
Counsel in Minnesota
Melissa M. Weldon*
The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when crimi-
nal procedures are made available only to those who can pay is
not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be im-
posed. The State's fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant.'
Introduction
Allison, a thirteen-year-old girl, waited in the hall of the Hen-
nepin County Juvenile Justice Center. 2 She knew she had to go to
court for skipping school. When she got to the courthouse, she
found that the county attorney was also charging her with disor-
derly conduct, a misdemeanor. She did not know where this charge
came from, and the petition was so vague that no one could deter-
mine the incident for which she was being charged. The county at-
torney, however, insisted on going forward with the proceeding.
While Allison contended that she was not guilty of disorderly con-
duct, her mother, who did not want to take off another day of work,
bullied her into pleading guilty.3 Allison felt cornered. The county
* J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, expected 1997; B.A., St. Cloud
State University, 1993. I would like to thank Professors Barry Feld and Richard
Frase for their thoughts on the juvenile court system, and Minnesota Chief Public
Defender John Stuart for his insight into the legislative history of these statutes. I
especially thank Les, my life partner, for his moral support. Finally, I dedicate this
article to my son, Ryan, in the hope that he can someday live in a world where soci-
ety treats people of all ages with respect, and where all people are equal in the eyes
of the law.
1. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197-99 (1971) (holding that the state must
provide the indigent defendant with the necessary tools for an effective appellate
review).
2. This hypothetical is drawn from actual cases that I have worked on in the
juvenile court as a Certified Student Attorney. Due to the confidentiality of juvenile
proceedings, any identifying information is excluded. While this hypothetical situa-
tion is based on my actual observations, it is a fictionalized account.
3. Child defendants do not "plead guilty," but they "admit." Different terms are
used in juvenile courts and adult courts to describe the same events. For example, in
juvenile court, the prosecutor files a "petition" rather than a "complaint." J. Mark
Andrus, Juvenile Court Practice, UTAH B.J., Oct. 1995, at 33. The youth is not "con-
victed," but "adjudicated delinquent." Catherine R. Guttman, Listen to the Children:
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was against her, her mother was against her, and she stood alone
without any legal protection.
In 1993, the legislature amended the Minnesota statute on
juveniles' right to counsel to provide that all Minnesota children,
including children like Allison, would have the right to an attor-
ney.4 Moreover, the 1994 legislation on the juvenile court system
assured that all children had the opportunity to consult with an
attorney before they could even waive this right to counsel.5
The 1995 Minnesota legislature stripped away this right from
many children by amending several juvenile court statutes. The
legislature expanded the definition of juvenile petty offender to en-
compass nearly all misdemeanors, 6 changed the sentences avail-
able for these offenses, 7 and stripped juvenile petty offenders of
their right to counsel.8 No longer will Minnesota children charged
with petty offenses-misdemeanors if committed by adults-enjoy
the right to counsel.9 Under this new regime, a thirteen-year-old
girl such as Allison stands very much alone. She faces the court
without an attorney by her side. Her only sources of legal advice
are the county attorney who prosecutes her and the judge who
sentences her.
The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507,
511 (1995). Both for clarity, and because often the reality of juvenile courts is the
same as adult court, I use the terms applicable to adult courts to describe the events
in juvenile courts throughout this article. Sometimes this is difficult to do. For ex-
ample, this article deals with a group of children charged with "juvenile petty of-
fenses." See infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. This category includes mostly
what would be known in the adult system as "misdemeanors." Id. The actions com-
mitted by the adult and the juvenile are exactly the same; the legislature merely
labels them differently. As this definition is at the heart of the new legislation, the
terms "juvenile petty offense" and "juvenile petty offender" will be used throughout
the article.
4. MiNN. STAT. § 260.155(2) (1994). "The child... [has] the right to assistance
of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court." Id.
5. Under the 1994 legislative changes, before a child could waive the right to
counsel "[tihe child must be fully and effectively informed of the child's right to coun-
sel and the disadvantages of self-representation by an in-person consultation with
an attorney, and counsel shall appear with the child in court and inform the court
that such consultation has occurred." MINN. R. Juv. P. 4.03(1). Furthermore, if a
child was charged with a gross misdemeanor or a felony, or if out-of-home placement
was proposed, the court had to appoint stand-by counsel even if a child had waived
the right to an attorney. Mm-N. STAT. § 260.155(2).
6. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.195, 1995 Minn. Laws
1176.
7. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 34, § 260.195(3), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1184.
8. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 25, § 260.155(2), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1180; Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 33, § 260.195, 1995 Minn.
Laws 1184.
9. See supra notes 6-8 (citing the new statutory provisions).
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An adult defendant in the same situation can request that the
court appoint an attorney for her.10 If the judge believed that, "in
the interests of justice," counsel would be necessary to protect that
defendant, the judge would have complete discretion to appoint an
attorney."1 Even without such a request, a judge in an adult crimi-
nal court can appoint counsel whenever she deems it necessary. 12
As such, an adult defendant in the same situation is granted
greater protection than a child.
This article argues that these statutory amendments violate
children's constitutional guarantees of due process and equal pro-
tection by unnecessarily creating a different standard for children
than adults. Part I describes the context in which the legislature
enacted these statutory changes, including a brief overview of the
juvenile court system, an explanation of the parameters of the con-
stitutional right to counsel, and a description of the 1995 amend-
ments' history. Part II analyzes the constitutionality of these
statutory amendments, specifically focusing on the viability of
equal protection and due process challenges to the different stan-
dards these changes created. This article concludes that these stat-
utory changes are unconstitutional. The new statutes arguably
violate the Equal Protection Clause, although a challenge may fail
under current children's rights jurisprudence. Under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, however, the statutes fail, even under the applicable
balancing test. The legislature can rectify these violations simply
by modifying the statutes to guarantee parity between an adult de-
fendant's and a child defendant's right to counsel when charged
with a petty or misdemeanor-level offense.
Background
A combination of factors led to the 1995 statutory amend-
ments to children's right to counsel. The juvenile court system was
founded upon certain values and assumptions that continue to in-
fluence legal and social decisions affecting children today. 13 Within
this framework, however, certain constitutional rights remain
which neither courts nor legislatures can violate, regardless of the
10. Mi. R. CRm. P. 5.02. "Provided that for misdemeanor offenses not punish-
able upon conviction by incarceration, the court may appoint an attorney for a de-
fendant financially unable to afford counsel when requested by defendant or
interested counsel or when such appointment appears advisable to the court in the
interests of justice to the parties." Id. at 5.02(2).
11. Id. at 5.02(2).
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (discussing the values and as-
sumptions upon which the juvenile court was built).
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defendant's age.14 In addition, politics and fiscal concerns moti-
vated the new legislation. The 1995 amendments were the result of
these historical, legal, and political factors.
A. A Segregated System of "Justice"
While American legal systems have always treated younger
people differently,15 there has not always been an entirely separate
court system for children. The segregated system evolved much
later in American history. Since its creation, this segregated sys-
tem has often been challenged, only sometimes successfully.16 The
philosophy behind the creation of the juvenile courts in the late
nineteenth century remains today and continues to affect the suc-
cess of challenges to differences between the systems.
1. The Creation of the Juvenile Court
A separate court system for children arose from the Progres-
sive ideals of the late nineteenth century.17 The Progressive re-
formers founded the juvenile court system on the belief that
children were different from adults, and thus in need of an entirely
separate court system.18
14. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (listing fundamental proce-
dural rights granted to children).
15. See, e.g., ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELIN-
QUENCY 101 (1969) (noting that, "Nineteenth-century legal doctrines and sentencing
policies made allowances for the immaturity and disabilities of children."). But see
PAUL R. KFoURY, CHILDREN BEFORE THE COURT: REFLECTIONS ON LEGAL ISSUES AF-
FECTING MINORS 37 (2d ed. 1991) (stating that children had the same rights and
received the same punishments as adults prior to the creation of juvenile courts).
16. See infra notes 24, 36-45 and accompanying text (describing various court
challenges).
17. The Progressive Era was a time in America's history -when a great deal of
broad-sweeping social reforms were enacted. The concepts of indeterminate sentenc-
ing, probation, parole, and many other reforms in the areas of child labor, education,
and social welfare in general emerged from this era. DAvm J. ROTHMAN, CON-
SCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE
AMERICA 3 (1980). There are many other resources available on the history of this
era. See generally JAMEs LEISY, A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK IN
THE UNITED STATES 136-62 (1978) (giving a brief history of the Progressive Era);
SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRES-
sIvE ERA (1982) (chronicling the child welfare movement of this era).
18. The idea of childhood was changing during this time period. ROTHmAN,
supra note 17, at 207-12. Society began to see childhood as a time of innocence and
vulnerability, and, therefore, the reformers believed that children needed adult pro-
tection and wisdom. Id.
For children who deviated from these ideals, the juvenile court system served as
a guiding force, putting children back on the right path. Unlike the adult system,
which served largely as a punitive institution, the juvenile system purported to help
rehabilitate youth. Id. at 213. For a detailed accounting of the origins of the juve-
nile court, see KFOURY, supra note 15, at 37-41; PLAT, supra note 15.
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To these reformers, the ideal system custom-made for children
revolved around individualized treatment and informal process-
ing. 19 The judge was to treat each child as an individual with a
unique case, focusing on that specific child rather than the specific
offense allegedly committed.20 Informality was important because
The separate legal status created for children has often been disabling. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 336.3-305(a)(lXi) (1994) (precluding children from making contracts);
MINN. STAT. § 517.02 (1994) (prohibiting children from marrying). Even if children
live in abusive homes, they do not have the right to move out and live on their own
without a parent's consent. See MINN. STAT. § 260.015(20) (1994) (defining such ac-
tions as a punishable offense). While many portray these measures as protective,
they are more often disabling. Consider the child's right to confidentiality in juvenile
court proceedings. While intended to protect the child from public stigmatization,
the closed-door policy of the juvenile court may actually serve to hide the court's
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the laws. MA. BORTNER, INSIDE A JU-
vENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 15 (1982).
19. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (describing these components of
juvenile court).
20. The judge was to "treat" the child based on that child's entire social history,
including socio-economic status, family circumstances, and past misbehavior. ROTH-
MAN, supra note 17, at 215-16. The court was to view each child separately, and
sentencing was to be indeterminate, based solely on the individual child's needs and
the progress that child would make in the "treatment" program. BORTNER, supra
note 18, at 1-14. The focus was on what the judge perceived the child needed, not on
the child's guilt or innocence. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV.
104, 119-20 (1909) (stating that, "The problem for determination by the judge is not,
Has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become
what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state
to save him from a downward career.").
Because the Progressives placed their faith in this process, they invested the
juvenile court judges and social workers with an enormous amount of discretion,
believing that the courts needed such broad discretion to achieve true "rehabilita-
tion." ROTHMAN, supra note 17, at 212. Unfortunately, courts often use this discre-
tion as a tool of discrimination:
The evidence clearly indicates that rather than viewing each child as an
individual, the juvenile court often operates in such a manner that chil-
dren are perceived and processed according to stereotypes. Individual-
ized justice abdicates to assembly-line justice; the child is black or poor
or female, not an individual. Visions of the unstable black family, the
inadequate lower-class environment, or the troublesome female run-
away supercede the needs of juveniles.
BORTNER, supra note 18, at 250.
Discrimination against youth of color continues to pervade the juvenile court
system. In 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the
Judicial System found that while "people of color comprise 8% of the state's juvenile
population, 22% of juveniles processed as delinquent are people of color." MINNE-
SOTA SuPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICLL SySTEM, FINAL
REPORT S-25 (1993) [hereinafter RACIAL BIAS TASK FORCE]. The study further
showed that "race is a significant, independent variable that influences decisions on
both pretrial detention and out-of-home placement" in the juvenile courts. Id. at 99.
This problem is at least partly due to the fact that there are "no objective written
detention criteria to guide anyone in the detention process." Id. at 102. Written
criteria are inconsistent, however, with the individualized approach.
The individualized approach has also resulted in gender discrimination, espe-
cially where status offenses are concerned. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Federal Juvenile
Justice Policy and the Incarceration of Girls, 36 CRuME & DELINQ. 503, 513 (1990).
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only in an informal court would the judge be free to interrogate the
child without the obstructions of defense counsel or procedural
rules.21 For years, the juvenile courts remained an individualized,
informal system, denying any procedural rights to children.22
Over time, the assumption has continued that children are less ca-
pable and less competent than adults, and therefore require differ-
ent treatment.2 3
2. Challenges to this Segregated System
Several challenges to the informal juvenile court system have
succeeded in guaranteeing children many of the procedural rights
already granted to adults. Children have brought these challenges
under both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses, and
often the courts combined the two clauses in their analyses.24
When children's procedural rights are at issue, the court must ask
not only whether children are receiving the procedural protections
to which they are constitutionally entitled, but also whether grant-
ing children fewer rights than adults violates children's right to
equal protection under the laws.
For example, in 1987, 18% of females in public detention centers were status offend-
ers, while only 3% of boys were. Id. See also BORTNER, supra note 18, at 32 (observ-
ing that females are more often incarcerated for status offenses); Cheryl Dalby,
Gender Bias Toward Status Offenders: A Paternalistic Agenda Carried Out Through
the JJDPA, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 429, 445-46 (1994) (noting that girls have a greater
chance than boys of having a petition filed against them because of a status offense).
21. According to the Progressive reformers' rationale, only in an informal court
could a judge discern the real needs of the child. RoTHmAN, supra note 17, at 216-17.
See also Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study
of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 CRiM. L. & CRIMINoLOGY
1185, 1192 (1988) [hereinafter Right to Counsel] (finding that, "Juvenile court judges
regarded lawyers as both irrelevant and an impediment to their 'childsaving'
mission.").
22. Some scholars have portrayed the separate system ofjustice as a benign and
humanitarian institution. BORTNER, supra note 18, at 3. In fact, this is the "image
that has dominated within American society, an image that presently is being chal-
lenged severely." Id.
23. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing
the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rv. 1083,
1120 (1991) ("[Jluvenile court professionals all too frequently assume that juvenile
accuseds are incapable of exercising sound judgment in making the decisions that
affect their cases."); Donald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble: Imple-
menting the Right to Appeal from Adjudication to Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98
DICK. L. REv. 209, 226 (1993) ("Many attorneys feel that adolescents, particularly
delinquent adolescents, have not reached the age of discretion and therefore lack the
capacity to intelligently discern their own best interests.").
24. See, e.g., In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1971). This case recognized
the necessity of using both clauses in an analysis of children's procedural rights:
"While these cases were decided under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no reason for withholding similar application of the equal pro-
tection clause in appropriate aspects of juvenile court proceedings." Id.
[Vol. 14:647
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The United States Supreme Court has based its equal protec-
tion analysis on varying levels of scrutiny.25 Therefore, one must
first ask which level of scrutiny such a challenge will receive. If a
fundamental right or a suspect class is involved,26 the court will
subject the legislation at issue to strict scrutiny,27 requiring that
the legislation be narrowly tailored to a compelling state goal.28 If
there is no fundamental right or suspect class, the Court will sub-
ject the legislation only to rational basis review, examining whether
the legislation is rationally related to permissible state goals.29
25. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(recognizing at least three levels of equal protection review). For criticism of using
varying levels of equal protection review, see id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(contending that "[tihere is only one equal protection clause"). For an explanation of
the various levels of equal protection review, see Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic
Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 121 (1989).
26. The Court has defined suspect classes as those groups that are "saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). In addition, the group must be "discrete and insu-
lar," United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), and the
defining characteristic should be "determined solely by the accident of birth," bear-
ing "no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society," Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion).
Certain classes are not suspect enough to receive strict scrutiny, but may be
semi-suspect enough to receive an intermediate level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (gender). This level of scrutiny requires that the state goal be important and
that the means used to achieve it are substantially related to that goal. Craig, 429
U.S. at 197 (enunciating this test).
The status of a given class is not necessarily stable. For example, a plurality of
the Court at one time subjected gender classifications to strict scrutiny. See Fron-
tiero, 411 U.S. at 688. Gender classifications now receive only intermediate scrutiny.
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. The current Clinton administration is pushing for the courts
to enhance this scrutiny, making gender a fully suspect class. '96 Rulings May
Equate Gender Bias with Racial Bias-But at What Cost?, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis),
Jan. 2, 1996, at A7.
For a general explanation of the suspect class analysis, see Mark Strasser, Sus-
pect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Other-
wise, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 937, 938-39 (1991).
27. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976) (per curiam) (finding that strict scrutiny did not apply because neither a fun-
damental right nor a suspect class was at issue); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
538 (1969) (finding the right to interstate travel fundamental and applying strict
scrutiny review).
28. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1995) (stating that race-
based classifications are subject to this test); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 (concluding
that the legislation affecting a fundamental right failed because there was no "com-
pelling state interest").
29. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (finding that state laws
are presumptively valid); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172
(1972) (stating that this test establishes the minimum requirement legislation must
meet).
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Minnesota courts apply a unique standard of review to equal
protection challenges. While Minnesota courts have consistently
analyzed equal protection challenges made by children under ra-
tional basis review,30 this rational basis test is much stricter than
the federal standard.31 When federal courts apply rational basis,
they will uphold legislation as long as there is any imaginable ra-
tionale for the classification. 3 2 Minnesota courts, however, do not
hypothesize rationales for the legislature.33 Rather, the legislature
must provide an actual justification for any differential
treatment.3 4
While both federal and Minnesota state courts have declared
that various procedural rights are fundamental for children, they
30. See, e.g., In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Minn. 1987) (using rational ba-
sis to deny a child the right to waive juvenile court jurisdiction). Minnesota courts
use rational basis in these cases because they have concluded that age is not a sus-
pect class. Id. See also infra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that federal
courts have also concluded that children are not a suspect class).
31. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991). More recent cases have
hinted that the courts may retreat from this heightened scrutiny. For example,
when a Minnesota court does not want to apply the stricter test, it simply cites to
pre-Russell decisions that used the more deferential standard. See, e.g., Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 316 (Minn. 1993) (citing In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 310
(Minn. 1986)).
Despite this, Russell has not been overruled and continues to be cited for the
heightened rational basis test in Minnesota cases. See, e.g., In re L.J.S. & J.T.IK,
539 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding presumptive certification for
certain juvenile offenses); State v. Jaworsky, 505 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (finding that Minnesota's sentencing guidelines do not offend the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Minnesota Constitution); Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896,
904 (Minn. Ct. App.) (striking down lower welfare benefits for new Minnesota resi-
dents), aff'd, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1992).
32. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it."); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("[I]f any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain... [the classification,
the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed.").
33. "[In the cases where we have applied.., the Minnesota rational basis analy-
sis, we have been unwilling to hypothesize a rational basis to justify a classification,
as the more deferential federal standard requires." Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
This case involved a drug sentencing scheme that treated crack cocaine users more
harshly than powder cocaine users. Id. at 887. Defendants charged under these
statutes challenged the scheme as having a disparate impact on African-Americans,
arguing that crack cocaine was used predominantly by blacks and powder cocaine
was used predominantly by whites. Id. Although the state argued that the legisla-
tion should pass the federal rational basis test, the court concluded that the legisla-
tion had to be evaluated under Minnesota law. Id. at 888. Accordingly, the court
applied the stricter Minnesota rational basis test and refused to guess pt the legisla-
ture's rationale. Id. at 889.
34. "Instead, we have required a reasonable connection between the actual, and
not just the theoretical, effect of the challenged classification and the statutory
goals." Id. The court would not rely on the "purely anecdotal testimony" offered by
the state to support the distinction. Id.
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have consistently held that age is not a suspect class.3 5 Therefore,
most equal protection challenges brought by children are subject to
rational basis review. Even under this test, however, the cases
make no clear determination of when children can constitutionally
be treated differently than adults.
These cases can be divided into two broad categories: those
where a child challenges the sentence given because it is harsher
than an adult would receive, and those where a child challenges the
procedure employed during her trial. In the sentencing cases,
courts use rational basis review, consistently upholding the dispa-
rate sentences.3 6
When procedure is at issue, however, courts consider the Due
Process Clause as well as the equal protection issues, and the ulti-
mate test is one of "fundamental fairness" to a child defendant.3 7
Here, courts balance the right asserted by a child against the effect
35. See, e.g., Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26-28 (1989) (stating that a differ-
ing age standard for entrance to a dance hall did not involve a suspect classification
and that rational basis was the appropriate test). Courts have concluded that youth
is not a suspect class because eventually, everyone "grows out" of it: "such require-
ments do not result in an absolute prohibition but merely postpone the opportunity
to engage in the conduct at issue." Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 265 (8th Cir. 1990)
(upholding the constitutionality of a minimum age requirement for holding public
office).
36. When children are tried in the juvenile court system, they may receive a
much longer sentence than an adult would receive for the same offense. See, e.g., In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967) (finding that while an adult could receive at a maxi-
mum two months jail time or a fifty dollar fine for the same offense, a child could be
institutionalized for six years). While many children have argued that such sentenc-
ing structures violate their right to equal protection under the laws, courts have
consistently upheld the disparate sentencing structures. See, e.g., United States v.
Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding the sentencing disparity of
the Youth Corrections Act); Backdahl v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 479 N.W.2d
89, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding longer driver's license suspension for chil-
dren under Minnesota's Equal Protection Clause).
The essential rationale is always the same: children are receiving treatment, not
punishment, and treatment takes time. See, e.g., Donelson, 695 F.2d at 588 (uphold-
ing the sentencing disparity of the Youth Corrections Act because of the Act's reha-
bilitative, rather than punitive, nature); Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding that longer sentences do not violate equal protection "be-
cause such confinement cannot be equated with incarceration in an ordinary prison")
(citing Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958)).
Although infrequent, children have had some success challenging disparate sen-
tencing standards. If a child can prove that the "treatment" being given to her or
him is no different than the punishment being given to an adult charged with the
same offense, the courts may invalidate the longer sentence. See, e.g., United States
v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974). The court in Preiser struck down a statu-
tory sentencing scheme that allowed youths to be sentenced longer than adults for
the same crimes because youths did not receive any special rehabilitative treatment,
thereby eliminating any distinction between juvenile training schools and adult pris-
ons. Id. at 1118-20.
37. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
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such a right will have on the juvenile court system as a separate
entity.38 If the right is fundamental, even a substantial effect on
the juvenile court system will be irrelevant.39 If, however, the court
finds that the right is not fundamental, it will closely scrutinize the
effect such a right will have on the informal proceedings of the juve-
nile courts.4O
Because of this balancing test, there is no clear indicator of
what specific rights will be granted to children. For example, courts
have found that the right to appeal,41 the right to have guilt proven
beyond a reasonable doubt,42 and the right to counsel 43 are all fun-
damental rights which must be granted to children irrespective of
the effect such rights may have on the juvenile courts. Conversely,
courts have extended to children neither the right to bail44 nor the
right to a jury trial45 based on the rationale that other protective
measures are already in place, and that the negative systemic ef-
fects of granting such rights outweigh any benefits that may accrue
to the child.46
The 1995 amendments must be analyzed in light of these his-
torical and legal considerations. Both equal protection and due pro-
cess rights must be protected in any statutory scheme that affects
children's right to counsel. In determining what level of scrutiny
these amendments should receive, the right at issue must first be
classified.
38. This test was first clearly enunciated in McKeiver, id. at 545, although a
similar analysis had been used previously to determine the rights of juveniles. See,
e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970) (upholding the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard as applied to juveniles since it would produce "no effect on the proce-
dures distinctive to juvenile proceedings").
39. See, e.g., In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1971) (granting juveniles
the right to appeal without first obtaining a special allowance from the court because
there is an absolute right of appeal); see also infra notes 42-43 and accompanying
text (citing other cases finding certain rights fundamental for children in juvenile
proceedings).
40. See, e.g., McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (concluding that "the jury trial.., will
remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effec-
tive end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
proceeding").
41. Brown, 439 F.2d at 52.
42. Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). This is not an absolute right to counsel in
all cases. The right to counsel granted to both children and adults contains many
limitations. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (describing the limits of
the right to counsel).
44. L.O.W. v. District Ct. of Arapahoe County, 623 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Colo. 1981)
(en banc).
45. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
46. See, e.g., id. at 543 (concluding that a judge could serve as fact-finder and a
jury would be too disruptive to the juvenile court).
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B. The Constitutional Right to Counsel
The appropriate standard of review for analyzing these statu-
tory changes depends at least in part on the right at issue.47 The
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a
criminal defendant the "Assistance of Counsel for his defence."48
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this clause over
time and has clarified those instances in which counsel must be pro-
vided both for adults and for children.
Under the federal standard, adult criminal defendants must
be represented by an attorney in any case where they are ulti-
mately sentenced to imprisonment.4 9 As the Supreme Court held
in Scott v. Illinois,50 even if a statute authorizes incarceration, the
judge can refuse to appoint an attorney based on the belief that in-
carceration will not occur in that particular case.5 1 In quasi-crimi-
nal proceedings, such as probation hearings or civil commitments,
the Supreme Court has authorized a more flexible due process stan-
47. See supra notes 26-29, 39-40 and accompanying text (explaining this prelim-
inary step in both generic equal protection analysis and when children's due process
rights are at issue).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
49. In the landmark case, Gideon v. Wainwright, 373 U.S. 335, 342 (1963), the
Court found that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a fundamental right
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon dealt specifi-
cally with a felony charge. Id. at 336-37. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 25
(1972), the Court held that even in a misdemeanor case, a defendant could not be
imprisoned without having had the advice of counsel at trial.
50. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
51. Id. at 369 (citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40). The court can impose
fines, probation, community service, or other non-incarcerative sentences without an
attorney representing the defendant. Id. There are numerous problems with this
case and its rationale. Most significantly, it requires the judge to decide the sentenc-
ing outcomes of the case before the evidence is presented. Id. at 374 (Powell, J.,
concurring). For further criticism of this opinion, see Alfredo Garcia, The Right to
Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRim. L. Rxv. 35,
54-56 (1991); Joseph N. Froehlich, Nichols v. United States: Defining the Proper Role
of Valid Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions in Subsequent Sentencing Enhance-
rent, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1737, 1755-60 (1995).
In addition, courts can enhance penalties based on earlier convictions, despite
lack of counsel, as long as the earlier conviction was constitutional. Nichols v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994). This case substantially changed right to
counsel jurisprudence, overturning an earlier decision, Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S.
222 (1980) (per curiam). For a criticism of this change, see, e.g., Christine S. May,
Casenotes and Comments, Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions and Their Unreli-
ability for Sentence Enhancement Under the United States Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Nichols v. United States, 18 HANLiN- L. Rxv. 231 (1994) (concluding
that Nichols was wrongly decided based on right to counsel precedent and the unre-
liability of misdemeanor convictions).
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dard,52 whereby the judge is to determine the defendant's right to
counsel on a case-by-case basis.53
In Minnesota, an adult's right to counsel is even more exten-
sive. An adult defendant must be represented by counsel in any
case where that defendant is charged with an offense where the
statute authorizes incarceration.54 In addition, Minnesota judges
have the discretion to appoint counsel for adults in any criminal
case where it is believed to be appropriate or necessary.55
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court extended the right
to counsel to child defendants.56 The Supreme Court continues to
uphold the child's right to counsel, and continually emphasizes the
important role an attorney plays in juvenile proceedings.57
C. Children's Right to Counsel in Minnesota
In the past, Minnesota complied with these constitutional
mandates in theory, while in practice children's right to counsel
was not always protected. Studies showed that the courts were not
even providing legally mandated counsel.58 In 1989, the Minnesota
Supreme Court responded by creating the Juvenile Representation
52. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974) (concluding that due
process requires flexibility); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973) (stating
that the need for an attorney arises from the intricacies of each specific case).
53. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. Gagnon was the first case to enunciate this stan-
dard for right to counsel in the non-criminal proceeding. It determined that counsel
was not necessary in all probation hearings, because they were not technically a
"stage of a criminal prosecution." Id. at 782. In finding that counsel may be re-
quired in certain instances, the Court emphasized that, in this case, there was still
the possibility of the defendant's loss of liberty. Id. This was the same line drawn in
Scott. 440 U.S. at 369.
54. MmN. R. CRnm. P. 5.02. This rule codified an earlier Minnesota decision
holding that counsel should be provided in any case where incarceration is statuto-
rily authorized. State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894-95 (1967).
55. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (describing this judicial
discretion).
56. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). In this case, the Court also limited a
minor's right to counsel to cases where there was the possibility of commitment to an
institution. Id.
57. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) ("[Tlhe lawyer is the
one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of
that person in his dealings with the police and the courts.").
58. There are several studies on the lack of counsel in juvenile courts. For Min-
nesota specifically, see JUVENILE REPRESENTATION STUDY COMMrrrEE TO THE MIN--
SOTA SuPREME COURT, REPORT 11 (1990) [hereinafter JUVENIE REPRESENTATION];
Right to Counsel, supra note 21, at 1185; Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A
Cross-State Comparison of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIE & DE-
LiNQ. 393 (1988).
Lack of counsel continues to be a problem in the juvenile court. A recent Ameri-
can Bar Association study concluded that 'juvenile court defendants often appear
with no lawyer at their side." ABA Study: Kids in Trouble are Lacking Legal Help,
STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Jan. 1, 1996, at A4.
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Study Committee to study whether children received counsel, and,
if not, why not.59
The Committee found that most children were going through
the system without legal representation. 6O Even worse, nearly one-
third of Minnesota children placed outside their homes and more
than one-fourth of Minnesota children incarcerated were not repre-
sented by an attorney during their trials.61 This was in direct con-
flict with the constitutional mandate requiring the court to appoint
counsel any time incarceration was imposed.62 The Committee also
found the most common explanation for lack of representation was
that children waived their right to an attorney,6 3 as encouraged by
judges.64
In response to these findings, the Minnesota legislature
formed the Supreme Court Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile
Justice System to study these issues further.65 The Task Force con-
cluded that the law should guarantee children the right to actual
legal representation in all juvenile court proceedings. 66 In re-
sponse to the invalid waiver problem, they recommended that a
child be advised of her rights before she was allowed to waive coun-
sel.67 The 1994 Minnesota legislature adopted the recommenda-
tions of the Task Force, 68 and enacted a number of statutes giving
59. JUVENIE REPRESENTATION, supra note 58, at 4; Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth
and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV.
965, 993 (1995) [hereinafter Public Policy].
60. The Committee found that less than half of all Minnesota children adjudi-
cated delinquent had been represented by counsel, and an even greater percentage of
children charged with less serious offenses were being tried without counsel. JUvE-
NILE REPRESENTATION, supra note 58, at 11.
61. Id. at 16. Furthermore, the actual presence of a defense attorney in juvenile
court varied greatly across the state. While in 1988, 48% of children convicted had
been represented by an attorney, the variation of representation across the state
ranged from 100% in one county to under 5% in another county. Id. at 11.
62. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (describing the federal consti-
tutional mandates for appointment of counsel). Furthermore, under Minnesota law,
an attorney should be present any time incarceration is statutorily authorized. See
supra notes 10-12, 54 (explaining Minnesota's more extensive right to counsel).
63. JUVENI REPRESENTATION, supra note 58, at 13.
64. Public Policy, supra note 59, at 1109. See also supra note 21 and accompany-
ing text (describing the perceived importance of informality in the juvenile court).
65. MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 1 (1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
66. Id. at 48-49. In these recommendations, the Task Force specifically ad-
dressed the issue of children charged with misdemeanors: "the Task Force recom-
mends that for juveniles charged with misdemeanors, in person consultation with a
defense attorney be mandatory prior to the juvenile being permitted to waive the
right to legal representation or to enter a plea to the petition." Id. at 49.
67. Id. at 49. These recommendations were codified in MIN. STAT. § 260.155(2)
and MINN. R. Juv. PRoc. 4.03(1).
68. Public Policy, supra note 59, at 987.
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Minnesota children an extensive right to counsel any time they ap-
peared before the court.6 9 Under this new legislation, Minnesota
children enjoyed the right to counsel in connection with any juve-
nile court proceeding.TO Children charged with misdemeanors had
to consult with an attorney before they could waive their right to
counsel.71 During this meeting, counsel had to provide a "full and
intelligible explanation of the child's rights."72 In any case where
the court felt counsel was necessary or appropriate, the judge had
discretion to appoint counsel, even if the child had waived that
right.73 Further, if the court concluded that the child could not af-
ford counsel, the court would appoint counsel at public expense.74
Thus, these statutes created an even broader statutory right than
the Constitution mandates. 75
Governor Arne Carlson applauded these new laws, largely be-
cause, in addition to granting children more procedural rights, the
new laws "got tough" on juvenile crime. 7 6 After signing these new
provisions into law, however, Governor Carlson vetoed all addi-
tional provisions providing the funding needed in order for the pub-
lic defender offices to represent these children.77 These new laws
69. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. § 260.155(2) (codifying the 1994 right to counsel for
children).
70. Id. "The child, parent, guardian or custodian have the right to effective
assistance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court." Id.
71. Id. "Before a child who is charged by delinquency petition with a misde-
meanor offense waives the right to counsel or enters a plea, the child shall consult in
person with counsel.. . ." Id. If the child is charged with a more serious offense, or
out-of-home placement is proposed, the court must appoint counsel or stand-by coun-
sel if the child waives the right to an attorney. Id.
72. Id.
73. MInN. STAT. § 260.155(2)(b). "If they desire counsel but are unable to em-
ploy it, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the child or the parents or guard-
ian in any other case in which it feels that such an appointment is desirable." Id.
74. MiNN. R. Juv. P. 4.02, 4.06.
75. The Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, only requires that
the right to an attorney exist when actual incarceration is imposed. See supra notes
49-51 (explaining the constitutional right to counsel).
76. "Carlson assented to the bill's provisions to heighten accountability and
stiffen penalties for young lawbreakers." Crime Fight: Pinching Pennies, Scrimping
on Justice, STAR TaRn. (Minneapolis), May 16, 1994, at A12.
77. "Carlson used his line-item veto authority to snuff $4.6 million in a $13.5
million juvenile justice bill. The money would have gone for public defenders, proba-
tion officers and four new judges." Robert Whereatt & Dennis J. McGrath, Legisla-
tors Push to Wrap Up Key Bills: Carlson Vetoes Funds for Education, Crime, STAR
Tam. (Minneapolis), May 6, 1994, at B1, B5.
When legislators write the "tough on crime" mantra into law, the result is often
lopsided funding with any additional money going to police and prisons rather than
to attorneys and courts. Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent
Defense Crisis is Chronic: Balanced Allocation of Resources is Needed to End the
Constitutional Crisis, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1994, at 13. Such measures "indicate a
failure to look at the criminal justice system as an 'ecosystem' wherein all the ele-
ments-law enforcement, prosecution, defense, the courts, and corrections-are in-
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mandating representation took effect on January 1, 1995, without
the funding necessary to make them a reality.7 S The Carlson veto
left the public defenders in a bind. They now had the statutory
duty to represent substantially more children, but no more money
with which to do so.7 9 In the next legislative session, the Minne-
sota legislature would have to deal with this discrepancy.
D. The 1995 Amendments
1. The Legislative History
In the spring of 1995, the Minnesota legislature grappled with
the issue of whether it could continue to guarantee children full
procedural rights without any of the funding needed to deliver the
statutorily required services. The "solution" came in a late night
meeting between Representative Dave Bishop, a member of the
House Committee on Judiciary Finance, and Minnesota Chief Pub-
lic Defender John Stuart.80 At this meeting, Bishop proposed doing
extricably woven together." Id. at 53. Minnesota has incredibly lopsided funding in
its justice system. In 1991, $798,000 was spent on law enforcement and corrections,
but only $271,700 was spent on the courts. DANIEL STORKAMP, CRIMUNAL JUSTICE
CENTER, JUsTIcE TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS IN MINNESOTA 8 (1995). See also Ken-
neth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial
Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for
Reform, 32 AM. CIm. L. REV. 743, 802-13 (1995) (describing the funding disparity
between prosecutors and public defenders).
78. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (effective
Jan. 1, 1995).
79. The new laws placed this burden on an already overburdened public de-
fender system. According to state board caseload standards, while the Hennepin
County Public Defender's office should have at least 157 attorneys, they currently
have only 86. Randy Furst, Public Defender Statute Ruled Unconstitutional, State
Funding Arbitrarily Limits Legal Assistance to the Needy, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Apr. 27, 1995, at B1. Because of this, the Hennepin County Chief Public Defender,
Bill Kennedy, sued the state because he was unable to effectively provide legal
assistance to his clients. Id. The lower court found the funding statute to be uncon-
stitutional, and the state appealed. Id. In February of 1996, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, concluding that Kennedy did not have
standing to sue because he had not shown a sufficient "injury in fact to himself or his
clients." Kennedy v. Carlson, Nos. CO-95-1282, C6-95-1559, 1996 WL 65766, at *7
(Minn. Feb. 16, 1996).
Similar problems exist throughout the country. In Atlanta, Georgia, public de-
fender Lynne Borsuk filed a motion asking the court not to appoint her to any more
cases. Patrick Noaker, It Doesn't Come With the Territory: Public Defenders Must
Decline to Violate Legal and Ethical Standards in the Face of Rising Caseloads,
CIum. JUST., Summer 1995, at 18. In retaliation, her supervisor "ultimately removed
Borsuk from the division in which she filed the motion and placed her in juvenile
court as punishment." Id. (emphasis added). Juvenile court assignments are often
seen as a punishment for attorneys. Many public defender offices place their most
inexperienced and incapable attorneys in the juvenile division. Right to Counsel,
supra note 21, at 1331.
80. Interview with John Stuart, Minnesota State Chief Public Defender, in Min-
neapolis, Minn. (Sept. 8, 1995).
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something to reduce the public defender caseloads in light of the
Carlson veto.8 1 Eventually, the two reached an agreement.
The legislature first discussed the terms of this agreement on
April 19, 1995, during a meeting of the House Committee on Judici-
ary Finance.82 Bishop began by explaining the proposed statutory
changes which would expand the scope of juvenile petty offenses
and in turn deny children counsel for those offenses.8 3 Stuart was
there to support Bishop and further explain the effect of these stat-
utory changes.84 There were two main objections to the proposal.
First, Representative William Macklin expressed concern
about including such a substantial policy change in a judiciary fi-
nance bill that would go through with little legislative attention or
discussion.8 5 While acknowledging that this represented a sub-
stantial change, Bishop asserted that such a change would actually
incite discussion of juvenile court issues.86
The next objection dealt with the decriminalizing effect of
these statutory changes. Along with taking away the right to coun-
sel, the proposed changes provided that juvenile petty offenders
could no longer be placed outside the home for such offenses.8 7
One representative expressed concern about the public perception
that the courts were too lenient and that such measures would add
to that perception.88
Throughout this discussion, a near consensus existed that the
main reason for such a change was fiscal. Bishop acknowledged
that the changes were being proposed for a "pecuniary goal."89
Others expressed a desire for a more extensive right for children, if
only funding were available. Macklin said that if the state could
afford it, all children should see an attorney before going to court.90
Stuart said that the public defender offices would be glad to provide
81. Id.
82. 31st Meeting of the House Comm. on Judiciary Fin., 79th Minn. Sess. (Apr.
19, 1995) [hereinafter Judiciary Fin. Meeting] (available on tape at the Minnesota




86. Id. To some extent, he may have been right. A month after the statutory
changes were enacted, there was a court challenge to the denial of counsel for juve-
nile petty offenders. See infra part I.D.3 (describing this challenge). It is unknown,
though, whether any real discussion of the issue has gone on among the general
public or even among the legal community.
87. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 34, § 260.195(3), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1184.
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service to all children, but that such a task was impossible given
the small budget available to them.91
After this discussion, there was one more request to take the
proposed changes off the agenda until the entire Judiciary Commit-
tee could discuss the issue.92 The committee chair, Representative
Murphy, explained that there had been other proposals included in
the bill that had not been agreed on unanimously.93 In response,
Bishop asked that these provisions remain in the omnibus judiciary
finance bill, and the committee voted.94 Although the vote was not
unanimous, a majority of the committee members accepted the pro-
posed changes.95
The Senate did not fully address this portion of the bill until
the entire judiciary finance bill reached the Conference Commit-
tee. 96 There was only minor discussion over a few word changes,
but the provision denying the right to counsel for juvenile petty of-
fenders remained. 97 This resulted in the current state of the law,
reclassifying child misdemeanants as petty offenders and stripping
away their right to counsel.
2. The Amendments
The first step in the new legislation was to expand the cate-
gory of juvenile petty offenses. While this category originally in-
cluded status offenses, alcohol offenses, and controlled substance
offenses,98 the legislature expanded the class to include almost all
misdemeanors, 99 with exceptions for more serious misdemean-
91. Id. John Stuart reiterated this position during an interview. Interview with
John Stuart, supra note 80. Stuart was obviously torn on this issue, but due to the
fiscal bind that the Carlson veto placed him in, he had very few other options.
92. Judiciary Fin. Meeting, supra note 82.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. There is no record of how many people did vote for passage of these provi-
sions. The tapes of the committee meetings, though, make clear that a majority of
the members did vote for the new statutes. Id.
96. Telephone Interview with John Curry, Administrator of the House Commit-
tee on Judiciary Finance (Nov. 17, 1995).
97. Id.
98. MIN. STAT. § 260.015(21) (1994).
99. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.015(21)(b), 1995
Minn. Laws 1176.
"Juvenile petty offense" also includes an offense, other than a violation
of section 609.224,609.324,609.563, 609.576, or 617.23, that would be a
misdemeanor if committed by an adult if-
(1) the child has not been found to be a juvenile petty offender on
more than two prior occasions for a misdemeanor-level offense;
(2) the child has not previously been found to be delinquent for a
misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony offense; or
Law and Inequality
ors. 00 In addition, the third time a youth is before the court
charged with a juvenile petty offense, the prosecutor has the discre-
tion to charge the child with either a petty offense or with a
misdemeanor. 101
With this new classification, the legislature changed the
sentences available to the court for youths charged as petty offend-
ers.102 No longer can courts sentence youths to out-of-home place-
(3) the county attorney designates the child on the petition as ajuvenile petty offender, notwithstanding the child's prior record of
misdemeanor-level juvenile petty offenses.
Id.
100. The exceptions are fifth degree assault, prostitution, arson, negligent fire,
and indecent exposure; these offenses are not classified as petty. Id. These excep-
tions resulted partly from the concern that the new sentences were too lenient. See
supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing this objection to the reduced
sentences available).
101. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.015(21)(b)(3), 1995
Minn. Laws 1176.
The county attorney also has the discretion to charge the youth under a child in
need of protection or services (CHIPS) petition. MINN. STAT. § 260.015(2a) (1994). A
CHIPS petition can be filed on behalf of a child for many reasons, including abandon-
ment, abuse, or neglect. Id. During a committee meeting on this proposed legisla-
tion, Minnesota Chief Public Defender John Stuart suggested that juvenile
misdemeanants could also be charged under subdivision nine of the CHIPS statute,
stating that a child in need of protection or services can be "one whose behavior,
condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or
others." Judiciary Fin. Meeting, supra note 82 (citing MIN. STAT. § 260.015(2aX9)
(1994)). If charged in this way, the child defendant would have the right to counsel.
Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 25, § 260.155(2)(aX2), 1995 Minn. Laws
1180. The defendant, however, would then be susceptible to receiving out-of-home
placement. MINN. STAT. § 260.191 (1994).
102. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 34, § 260.195(3), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1184.
If the juvenile court finds that a child is a petty offender, the court
may:
(a) require the child to pay a fine of up to $100;
(b) require the child to participate in a community service project;
(c) require the child to participate in a drug awareness program;
(d) place the child on probation for up to six months;
(e) order the child to undergo a chemical dependency evaluation
and if warranted by this evaluation, order participation by the
child in an outpatient chemical dependency treatment program;
(f) order the child to make restitution to the victim; or
(g) perform any other activities or participate in any other outpa-
tient treatment programs deemed appropriate by the court.
In all cases where the juvenile court finds that a child has
purchased or attempted to purchase an alcoholic beverage in violation
of section 340A.503, if the child has a driver's license or permit to drive,
and if the child used a driver's license, permit or Minnesota identifica-
tion card to purchase or attempt to purchase the alcoholic beverage, the
court shall forward its finding in the case and the child's driver's license
or permit to the commissioner of public safety. Upon receipt, the com-
missioner shall suspend the child's license or permit for a period of 90
days.
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ment for these offenses. 10 3 The court, however, can still impose
fines, community service, probation, restitution, outpatient forms of
treatment for drug awareness and chemical dependency, or any
other outpatient program. 0 4
In addition, when a child comes before the court on her third
petty offense, she will no longer be charged as a juvenile petty of-
fender, but, instead, as a juvenile delinquent.10 5 Furthermore, on
the second charge for an offense involving alcohol or a controlled
substance, the court can impose a harsher sentence, including sus-
pension, revocation, or denial of the child's driver's license or per-
mit.' 0 6 For the third offense involving alcohol or controlled
None of the dispositional alternatives described in clauses (a) to (f)
shall be imposed by the court in a manner which would cause an undue




105. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.015(21XbX1), 1995
Minn. Laws 1176. Even in this situation, however, the county attorney has the au-
thority to designate the child as a petty offender despite that child's prior record. Act
effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.015(21Xb)(3), 1995 Minn. Laws
1176; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecutorial
discretion in these cases).
To some extent, this is just another part of the strange labelling system in the
juvenile court. See supra note 3 (explaining terminology used in juvenile court). On
the other hand, being labeled "delinquent" has serious sentencing consequences,
subjecting the child to out-of-home placement, MINN. STAT. § 260.185 (1994), and
may be used against the child at sentencing if later charged with an adult crime. See
infra note 232 (explaining the effect of a delinquency finding on a later adult
sentence).
106. Mn-N. STAT. § 260.195(3a) (1994). In addition to the penalties already pro-
vided for in the petty offender statute, on the child's second alcohol or controlled
substance offense, the court can also impose any of the following sentences:
(b) If the adjudicated petty offender has a driver's license or permit, the
court may forward the license or permit to the commissioner of public
safety. The commissioner shall revoke the petty offender's driver's li-
cense or permit until the offender reaches the age of 18 years or for a
period of one year, whichever is longer.
(c) If the adjudicated petty offender has a driver's license or permit, the
court may suspend the driver's license or permit for a period of up to 90
days, but may allow the offender driving privileges as necessary to
travel to and from work.
(d) If the adjudicated petty offender does not have a driver's license or
permit, the court may prepare an order of denial of driving privileges.
The order must provide that the petty offender will not be granted driv-
ing privileges until the offender reaches the age of 18 years or for a
period of one year, whichever is longer. The court shall forward the
order to the commissioner of public safety. The commissioner shall
deny the offender's eligibility for a driver's license under section 171.04,
for the period stated in the court order.
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substances, the court has authority to order a chemical dependency
evaluation and inpatient chemical dependency treatment.' 0 7
The legislature also changed the appointment of counsel stat-
ute. Children charged as petty offenders no longer receive coun-
sel. 10 8 While they are still free to retain private counsel if they can
afford it, the court is not allowed to appoint counsel at public ex-
pense,l0 9 even if the judge believes it is necessary.11o
These statutory amendments substantially diminished the
right to counsel that the 1994 legislation had guaranteed to chil-
dren."' On July 1, 1995, the current legislation took effect,112 and
this newly-created class of petty offenders no longer has the right to
legal representation in the courts.
3. A Court Challenge
These amendments have already been challenged. In August
of 1995, a fifteen-year-old girl was brought to juvenile court in
Steele County for violating a curfew ordinance and consuming alco-
hol as a minor. 1" 3 In this case, In re R.M.H., Judge Casey J. Chris-
tian appointed counsel for the accused.114 The Third District
107. MINN. STAT. § 260.195(4). For the third alcohol or controlled substance of-
fense, in addition to the petty offender penalties, "the juvenile court shall order a
chemical dependency evaluation of the child and if warranted by the evaluation, the
court may order participation by the child in an inpatient or outpatient chemical
dependency treatment program, or any other treatment deemed appropriate by the
court." Id.
108. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 25, § 260.155(2), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1180.
(a) The child, parent, guardian or custodian has the right to effective
assistance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court
unless the child is charged with a juvenile petty offense as defined in
section 260.015, subdivision 21....
(b) If they desire counsel but are unable to employ it, the court shall
appoint counsel to represent the child or the parents or guardian in any
case in which it feels that such an appointment is desirable, except a
juvenile petty offense as defined in section 260.015, subdivision 21.
Id.
109. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 33, § 260.195, 1995 Minn. Laws
1184 ("A child alleged to be a juvenile petty offender may be represented by counsel,
but does not have a right to appointment of a public defender or other counsel at
public expense.").
110. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 25, § 260.155(2), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1180.
111. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (describing the 1994
legislation).
112. Effective Dates, ch. 226, art. 7, sec. 27, 1995 Minn. Laws 1233.
113. Petition for Writ of Prohibition at 1, In re R.M.H. (3d Minn. Cir. Aug. 22,
1995) (No. J2-95-50352), writ granted.
114. Order, In re R.H. (3d Minn. Cir. Oct. 3, 1995) (No. J2-95-50352), vacated.
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Public Defender refused to take the case,1 15 citing the new statutes
and explaining that public defender services were no longer avail-
able for this petty offender.116 Judge Christian issued an order de-
claring that, by treating children differently than adults, these
statutes violated the right to counsel provided by the Minnesota
Constitution"l7 and the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.118 He further ordered the public defender to take this
case and all other cases involving juvenile petty offenders.119 The
Minnesota State Public Defender's office appealed, requesting a
Writ of Prohibition from the Minnesota Court of Appeals quashing
Judge Christian's order.12o
The Fourth District Public Defender filed an amicus curiae
brief in support of Judge Christian's order, arguing that the new
statutory regime violated the United States Constitution on equal
protection grounds. 12 1 The public defender pointed out that judges
in similar situations in adult court would have the discretion to ap-
point counsel if they felt it was necessary.122 The public defender
further alleged that children charged with petty offenses faced a
loss of liberty and were therefore entitled to counsel under Scott v.
Illinois. 123
115. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 3, Fourth District Public Defender, In re R.H. (3d
Minn. Cir. Sept. 8, 1995) (No. C3-9-1793).
116. Id.
117. Memorandum, In re R.M.H. (3d Minn. Cir. Aug. 14, 1995) (No. J2-95-50352).
"Juvenile proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and the state constitutional
right to assistance of counsel should apply to these proceedings. The proceedings are
tried before a judge and the State is required to prove the elements of the petition
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
118. Id. "The legislative changes, concerning a juvenile's right to counsel, violate
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, by denying a juvenile the
right to an attorney when an adult, in similar circumstances would be entitled to
legal representation." Id.
119. Order, In re R.H. (3d Minn. Cir. Oct. 3, 1995) (No. J2-95-50352), vacated.
120. Petition for Writ of Prohibition, In re R.M.H. (3d Minn. Cir. Aug. 22, 1995)
(No. J2-95-50352), writ granted.
121. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fourth District Public Defender at 10, In re R.H.
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (No. C3-95-1793).
122. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (describing the right to counsel
for Minnesota adults).
123. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fourth District Public Defender at 10-11, In re R.H.
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (No. C3-95-1793). The public defender argued that probation,
community service, and counseling programs all entail a loss of liberty for the juve-
nile petty offender. Id.
The Fourth District Public Defender also argued that children face a greater loss
of liberty than adults by comparing adult petty misdemeanants to juvenile petty of-
fenders. Id. at 9. The juvenile petty offender is the equivalent of an adult misde-
meanant. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.015(2lXb), 1995
Minn. Laws 1176 (defining a petty offense as an offense "that would be a misde-
meanor if committed by an adult"). These two groups, however, are not equivalent.
An adult misdemeanant may receive a jail sentence of up to ninety days or a fine of
Law and Inequality
In October of 1995, the Minnesota Court of Appeals granted
the Writ of Prohibition in part, but found that if there was a chance
that this fifteen-year-old girl could face enhanced penalties due to
the alcohol violation, the court could then appoint counsel.124 With
this minor variation, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the
statutory scheme denying juvenile petty offenders the right to coun-
sel.125 The order was based largely on the constitutional link be-
tween incarceration and the right to counsel established in Scott v.
Illinois. 126 The court found that, except for the enhanced penalties
available for alcohol and controlled substance offenses, a juvenile
petty offender could not receive out-of-home placement, and, there-
fore, had no constitutional right to counsel.127
This case failed to address the issue of the level of discretion
the judge retains over the appointment of counsel for juvenile petty
offenders who do not face the enhanced penalties. The court explic-
itly narrowed its decision to the fact that Judge Christian's order
granted public defenders to all juvenile petty offenders.128 The
court of appeals found that he did not have such authority,12 9 but
did not say that a judge should not have the authority in certain
cases.130 Instead, the court remanded the decision to the district
court for more specific findings on whether enhanced penalties
would be possible.13' Thus, this case did not directly address the
constitutionality of denying a judge the discretion to appoint coun-
sel in cases where she believed an attorney was necessary or appro-
priate-the same power that a judge has in an adult criminal court.
This issue remains unresolved. While In re R.M.H. seems to
suggest that judges have discretion to appoint counsel for juvenile
up to seven hundred dollars. Mwm. STAT. § 609.02(3) (1994). Therefore, an adult
misdemeanant is susceptible to a loss of liberty through confinement.
124. Order at 2, In re R.T-. (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (No. C3-95-1793). The court
neither wrote nor published an opinion. Rather, it simply issued a three-page order
providing a skeletal analysis of its decision.
125. Id.
126. 440 U.S. 367, 368 (1979). See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text
(describing the constitutional link between incarceration and the right to counsel).
127. Order at 1, In re R.H. (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (No. C3-95-1793). The court's
decision was largely based on the fact that "[the legislature has removed any possi-
bility that first-time juvenile petty offenders will suffer detention as a result of their
offense, even in the form of inpatient treatment." Id.
128. Id. at 2. "Petitioner has shown that the district court exceeded its authority
in extending the right to counsel to all juvenile petty offenders. Petitioner has not
shown, however, that the district court could not appoint counsel for R.H. or other
individual juvenile petty offenders, particularly those who face the enhanced penal-
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petty offenders when enhanced penalties are available, it does not
expressly grant judges the power to appoint counsel for other juve-
nile petty offenders. According to the statutes, juvenile judges do
not have this power. The constitutionality of the remainder of these
statutes should be subjected to both the equal protection and due
process analysis.
I. Analysis
Ideally, no one of any age would appear in court without legal
representation.13 2 Given current fiscal restraints, however, provid-
ing representation for all defendants is not feasible.133 Because of
the cost of public defenders, even adult defendants are not automat-
ically provided an attorney. 134 Any adult defendant, however, can
request that the court provide an attorney.'3 5 More importantly,
the adult criminal court judge can grant that defendant an attorney
whenever justice requires representation.13 6 An analysis of these
statutory amendments under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses illustrates that the child defendant must be given this
same right.
A An Equal Protection Analysis
1. The Appropriate Standard for Review
The first step in an equal protection analysis is to determine
whether the statutes in question use a suspect classification or im-
pinge on a fundamental right, thereby calling for strict scrutiny re-
view.13 7 Courts have consistently held that children are not a
suspect class,138 but this conclusion is questionable. The law de-
nies children almost all civic and political rights, and grants them
very little autonomy.13 9 Courts often use a group's lack of political
132. This same hope was expressed several times in the legislature's discussion of
these statutory changes. Judiciary Fin. Meeting, supra note 82. See supra notes 89-
91 and accompanying text (describing the Minnesota House Committee on Judiciary
Finance's discussion of this legislation).
133. Interview with John Stuart, supra note 80. See supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the fiscal limitations on the public defender system).




137. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (describing the applicable
analysis when a fundamental right or suspect class is at issue).
138. See supra notes 30, 35 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that age
is not a suspect classification).
139. In Minnesota, children do not have the right to vote, MwN. STAT.
§ 201.014(1l(a) (1994), and cannot serve on juries, MmN. GEN. R. PRAc., Rule
808(bX2) (West 1995). A similar lack of autonomy and political power has often mo-
Law and Inequality
power as the prime indicator that a group deserves suspect class
status. 14o Current precedent indicates, however, that the legal sys-
tivated the Court to find a classification suspect. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (finding classifications based on sex highly suspect). "Neither
slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names,
and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey
property .... " Id. at 685. These same rights are denied to children based on the
romantic misperception that children are innocent and incompetent. See Ainsworth,
supra note 23, at 1091-95 (discussing the social construction and misperceptions of
childhood).
This imposed ideal of innocence was also used for years as a basis for denying
women equal protection of the law. "Traditionally, such discrimination was rational-
ized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women,
not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. Because children are at
risk of similar discrimination, they should at least be granted that level of scrutiny
which applies to gender classifications. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a statute treating males differently than
females regarding the legal drinking age).
In addition, children are subject to an alarming amount of abuse at the hands of
adults. This abuse may be emotional, sexual, or physical, and is often fatal. Rachel
L. Jones, Life Becoming Worse for American Kids, Welfare Activists Say, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 8, 1996, at Al (citing 1996 Children's Defense Fund and Na-
tional Low Income Housing Coalition studies finding that three children die in
America every day from abuse and neglect). Pervasive abuse is especially relevant
to the discussion ofjuvenile courts because childhood abuse increases the chances for
future delinquency by forty percent. CATHY SPATz WIDoM, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE 1 (1992).
While abuse in itself is not a traditional sign of a suspect class, it is one indica-
tion of the "purposeful unequal treatment" to which children have been subjected.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (discussing "tradi-
tional indicia of suspectness"). Children need additional protection because courts
have been unwilling to protect them from such violence. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Win-
nebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (holding that "the
State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua," a four-year-old boy, from physi-
cal abuse resulting in permanent injury); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 656-57,
664 (1977) (holding that corporal punishment in public schools did not violate the
Constitution although the child suffered a hematoma requiring medical attention as
a result of a paddling inflicted with a two-foot long, one-half inch thick wood board).
Moreover, children between the ages of 12 and 17 are more likely than adults to
be the victims of crime and hostility. HowARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND,
NAT'L CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS
AND VIcTIms: A Focus ON VIOLENCE 14 (1995); see Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch.
Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(arguing that one reason homosexuals should be considered a suspect class is be-
cause they have been the object of hostility).
For a thorough discussion of the institution of childhood in America in relation
to constitutional protections, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse
as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1359
(1992).
140. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (reasoning that gender is a suspect classi-
fication because women had been denied the right to vote); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28
(listing "political powerlessness" as one of the defining characteristics of a suspect
class); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating
that a classification requires special scrutiny when that class cannot rely on the
"political processes").
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tern is unlikely to accept the proposition that children are a suspect
class.141
Therefore, the only feasible way to obtain strict scrutiny re-
view in this case is to find that there is a fundamental right at is-
sue. Under current jurisprudence, the right to counsel in the
criminal context is only fundamental if the judge imposes incarcer-
ation.14 2 In the juvenile system, being placed outside the home is
the equivalent of incarceration, whether one is placed in a training
school, an inpatient treatment program, or any other institution.1
4 3
Under the new statutes, children cannot be placed outside the
home, at least initially, for a petty offense.14 4 On this basis, the
right to counsel for all juvenile petty offenders is not fundamental
under Scott v. Illinois.14 5
The issue changes slightly, however, when a child is charged
with her third petty offense and the county attorney has the option
to prosecute her as a misdemeanant rather than a petty of-
fender.146 Of course, once a child is charged as a "delinquent," she
will have the right to counsel.147 The issue is also different when
children are charged with a second or third alcohol or controlled
substance offense, making enhanced sentences available.148 Be-
cause of the increased severity of sentencing options in such in-
stances, a judge has the discretion to appoint an attorney.' 4 9
Considering that upon a conviction for one of these charges a child
141. See supra notes 30, 35 and accompanying text (citing cases that hold children
are not a suspect class).
142. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
limits on the right to counsel).
143. See Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel in
Quasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19
HI- v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 397, 410 (1984); Right to Counsel, supra note 21, at 1229.
144. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 34, § 260.195(3), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1184. Children can, however, receive enhanced penalties for later offenses,
especially if alcohol or a controlled substance is involved. See supra notes 105-07
and accompanying text (describing the enhanced penalties available).
145. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (explaining the federal stan-
dard for right to counsel).
146. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.015(21XbX3), 1995
Minn. Laws 1806.
147. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 25, § 60.155(2), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1180.
148. MIN. STAT. § 260.195(3a)-(4) (1994).
149. Order at 2, In re R.H. (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (No. C3-95-1793). The Minne-
sota Court of Appeals has already addressed this issue, see supra part I.D.3, there-
fore this article focuses mainly on the child's right to counsel for any petty offense,
even when enhanced penalties are not available.
Law and Inequality
may receive inpatient treatment, this is consistent with the consti-
tutional limits of the right to counsel.150
Precedent indicates that the right to counsel for all juvenile
petty offenders is not fundamental.'15 If it were, the statutes would
be subject to strict scrutiny, and the government would have the
burden of proving that the statutes are narrowly tailored to meet
compelling state interests.' 5 2 It is unlikely they would meet this
burden given that the state interest is primarily fiscal. 153 By sim-
ply giving judges the discretion to appoint counsel when necessary,
legislators could save money without leaving children unpro-
tected,154 thereby showing that the means used are not narrowly
tailored to the goal. The legislation, however, would only have to
pass this test if the court applied strict scrutiny to the legislation.
If the courts do not find that this right is fundamental, which
they probably will not, 1'5 and if they do not find that children are a
suspect class, which they most certainly will not,' 5 6 the courts will
apply only rational basis review. Even under the rational basis
test, this legislation could still fail.
2. Rational Basis Review
The federal rational basis test is very deferential to the gov-
ernment,15 7 with the court asking whether the means used are ra-
tionally related to legitimate state goals.158 The state's primary
150. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 25 (1972) ("[N]o person may be impris-
oned for any offense, whether classified as petty misdemeanor, or felony, unless he
was represented by counsel at his trial."). See also supra notes 49-51 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the limits of the right to counsel).
151. This precedent, however, is flawed. If children require a separate system of
justice because they need more protection than adults, they should not receive less
procedural protection in juvenile court than they would have received in adult court.
The right to counsel for all children should be fundamental. See infra note 183 and
accompanying text (discussing further the logical fallacy in giving children less pro-
tection in the juvenile courts).
152. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (describing the application of
strict scrutiny review).
153. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (describing the Minnesota
House Committee on Judiciary Finance's discussion of this legislation).
154. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text (discussing the fiscal effects of
granting children equal rights in this area).
155. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (explaining the nature of this
right).
156. See supra notes 30, 35 and accompanying text (citing cases that hold children
are not a suspect class).
157. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (stating the presump-
tion that state laws are valid); Massachsetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 316 (1976) (asserting that exact precision is not required in legislation that re-
lies on classifications).
158. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining the rational basis test).
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goal in the 1995 legislation taking away juvenile petty offender's
right to counsel was to save money.159 As a result of the Carlson
veto, the public defender offices were incapable of handling the in-
creased number of juvenile cases which resulted from the 1994 ju-
venile justice legislation.160 The legislature chose to resolve this
dilemma by reducing public defender caseloads rather than reallo-
cating resources in a way that would allow the public defender sys-
tem to operate effectively.
The first question is whether saving money from a strained
state budget is a legitimate interest. Given the current limited re-
sources and taxpayers' unwillingness to contribute more to the
state budget,161 it may be a legitimate state interest. Nevertheless,
the legislation must be rationally related to that interest.16 2 Under
rational basis review, the Supreme Court will hypothesize ratio-
nales for the state.163 If the Justices can imagine any plausible rea-
son to uphold the legislation, they will do so.164 To come up with
such a rationale, the courts can look to the traditional view of the
roles juvenile court personnel play. Everyone within the system
seems to be working for the child defendant: the county attorney,
the judge, the social workers, and the parents are all presumed to
be acting in the best interests of the child.165 Further, the child
defendant is deemed incapable of making decisions for herself.166
159. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (describing the discussion sur-
rounding this legislation in the House Committee on Judiciary Finance).
160. Interview with John Stuart, supra note 80. See also supra note 79 and ac-
companying text (describing the overburdened public defender system).
161. See Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 77, at 53 (discussing the lopsided
funding caused by current politics); Interview with John Stuart, supra note 80
(describing the difficulty of obtaining additional funding for public defender
services).
162. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining the rational basis test).
163. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the application of the
federal rational basis test).
164. Id.
165. "Juvenile justice practitioners enjoy greater discretion than do their adult
process counterparts because of their presumed need to look beyond the present of-
fense to the 'best interest of the child' and paternalistic assumptions about the con-
trol of children." Right to Counsel, supra note 21, at 1225. This can lead to role
confusion for public defenders in juvenile court. They often do not know whether
they should be zealously advocating for their client's legal rights or ensuring that
their client's social needs are addressed. Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1129-30.
166. "[J]uvenile court professionals all too frequently assume that juvenile ac-
cuseds are incapable of exercising sound judgement in making the decisions that
affect their cases." Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1120. This assumption of incompe-
tency has been explicitly asserted by other child welfare professionals as well.
"Counsel cannot turn directly to the children whom he represents for his instruc-
tions. Children are by definition persons in need of adult caretakers who determine
what is best for them." JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHID 122 (1979).
Law and Inequality
The court is operating on the child's behalf at the outset, so there is
no need for an extra person to advocate for the child.167
The adult system operates on a completely different assump-
tion. 168 No one assumes that the county attorney is prosecuting the
defendant in order to keep her from a downward spiral into a life of
crime. Rather, it is assumed that the adult defendant has a mind of
her own, willingly chose to commit the illegal act, and deserves to
be punished for her offense.169 Moreover, the adult court judge is to
be a neutral party weighing the evidence, and meting out punish-
ment, but certainly not acting in the best interests of the criminal
defendant.
Our view of the two systems' differing roles is not realistic.
The juvenile court is becoming increasingly punitive.170 Almost
every state's juvenile code contains a purpose clause, which lays out
the functions and ideals of that state's juvenile courts.171 Previ-
ously almost all juvenile purpose clauses professed that the juvenile
system was meant as a place for treatment and rehabilitation. 72
In the last twenty years, however, these clauses have been
amended to include a call for punishment and public safety. 173 The
juvenile court workers are no longer working only for the best inter-
167. See THEODORE J. STEIN, CHI WELFARE AND Tm LAw 81 (1991). In the first
juvenile courts, judges often used this rationale to exclude lawyers from the juvenile
courtroom. See RoTHmAN, supra note 17, at 216 (noting that a paternalistic juvenile
court could not be bound by formal and technical rules).
168. The differing assumptions of the juvenile court rest on the notion of parens
patriae, "the state as the parent of the child." Ro'rmAN, supra note 17, at 212. Be-
cause adults are considered autonomous beings, this doctrine is inapplicable to the
adult court system. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
169. See John E. Coons et al., Puzzling Over Children's Rights, 1991 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 307, 327 (1991) (noting that Americans hold adults accountable because they
assume adults have free will); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Be-
tween Rules and Standards, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 351,379 (1991) (observing that the
courts assume that adults make autonomous decisions about their own conduct).
170. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1106-08 (describing the new juvenile
court regime in Washington state); Barry C. Feld, The Punitive Juvenile Court and
the Quality of Procedural Justice: Disjunctions Between Rhetoric and Reality, 36
CRmE & DELINQ. 443, 454 (1990) [hereinafter Procedural Justice] (discussing the
daily life of incarcerated juveniles); Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juve-
nile Offender Statutes: Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juve-
nile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479, 485-86 (1995) (noting that the juvenile
system has become more punitive).
171. See, e.g., MN. STAT. ANN. § 260.011(2)(c) (West 1992).
172. Before 1980, the Minnesota code merely provided that the "paramount con-
sideration" in all juvenile proceedings was the "best interest of the child." Id.
§ 260.011(2Xa).
173. Id. ("The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to be
delinquent is to promote the public safety . . . ."). This section was added in 1980.
Id. Other states changed their juvenile purpose clauses as well. For example, in
1977, California added "protection and safety of the public" to its purpose clause,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a) (West Supp. 1996), while in 1988, the Utah legis-
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ests of the child, but also for the best interests of the public. There-
fore, there is a need for an extra person to advocate for the child. As
the juvenile court system is incredibly resistant to any major re-
form,174 however, it is unlikely that the current Supreme Court will
accept a new view of the juvenile court in order to defeat legislation
such as this.
Minnesota courts, however, operate under a different stan-
dard of review.175 If no fundamental right or suspect classification
is at issue, Minnesota courts will also use a rational basis test, but
the application of this test is stricter.176 The Minnesota standard
requires that the legislature have given an actual justification for
the classification and the differential treatment. 177 Under this test,
the government is required to prove that there is an actual legiti-
mate state interest and that the means used are sincerely related to
the desired goal.178
This heightened standard requires that the court look at the
juvenile system as it really exists. As the societal vision of the juve-
nile justice system changes, and the underlying philosophy becomes
more punitive,' 7 9 the idea that juvenile court workers are already
working on behalf of the child is an insufficient rationale for differ-
ential treatment under the heightened standard. Often, the main
difference between adult and juvenile court is a lack of procedural
parity between the two.180 If the two systems are the same, there
can be no rational basis for differential treatment.18 '
lature rewrote its purpose statute to call for "public safety and individual accounta-
bility." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-1(1) (1995).
174. "[E]ven today, the [juvenile court] program continues to attract dedicated
support and remains surprisingly invulnerable to fundamental change." ROTHMAN,
supra note 17, at 205.
175. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (explaining Minnesota's




179. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1106-08 (describing the shift to a puni-
tive, offense-based philosophy in the juvenile court system); see also supra notes 170-
73 and accompanying text (observing the emerging punitive purposes of juvenile
courts).
180. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1119 (concluding that "the procedural
contrast between the [adult and juvenile] systems is the most salient feature of the
juvenile justice system"); Procedural Justice, supra note 170, at 444 (stating that
"the sole distinguishing characteristic [of the juvenile system] is its persisting proce-
dural deficiencies").
181. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punish-
ment, Treatment and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 909-14 (1988)
(analyzing the move toward a philosophy of punishment in the juvenile court and
arguing that this shift creates an increased need for procedural parity between the
child and adult systems).
Law and Inequality
If, however, we continue to accept the notion that the two sys-
tems are philosophically different, then the differing standards
must be analyzed in light of those philosophies. A separate court
system for children was created and is maintained on the belief that
children are more vulnerable than adults and, therefore, need more
protection.182 Based on this philosophy, there is no rational basis
for giving children less protection in the courts than adults receive.
On the contrary, based on this philosophy, children should have a
more extensive right to counsel than adults because they are more
vulnerable and need more protection.183
This heightened protection argument, however, may not suc-
ceed even under the Minnesota standard. In a recent decision, In re
KC. ,184 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld an age-based dis-
tinction using the heightened rational basis test.' 8 5 Children who
are sixteen years of age and older are treated differently than chil-
dren under sixteen for purposes of juvenile court waiver, the pro-
cess used to certify a child to stand trial in adult court.1 8 6 The
court upheld this distinction on the basis that the juvenile courts
dispense treatment, not punishment, and treatment takes time.
18 7
The court of appeals considered it rational to treat children sixteen
years and older differently from children under sixteen.' 8 8 While
the decision did not involve a classification separating children
from adults, it did involve accepting the notion that juvenile courts
dispense treatment and therefore people of different ages can be
treated differently.
Since the age-based classification in In re K.C. was a distinc-
tion between children under age sixteen and children over six-
teen,'8 9 it can be distinguished from a challenge to the new
legislation which differentiates between children and adults. This
case demonstrates, however, that the Minnesota courts are still
182. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the philosophy upon
which the segregated court system was founded).
183. A similar argument was made in In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1971).
Brown held that children had an automatic right of appeal without having to obtain
a special allowance from the court. Id. at 54. The court reasoned that the "informal-
ity and flexibility of the juvenile adjudication and the subsequent treatment make
the right to appeal perhaps more, and certainly not less, vital to safeguard those
subject to the juvenile process from the possible degeneration warned against in
Gault." Id. at 52.
184. 513 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
185. Id. at 23.
186. MI-N. STAT. § 260.125(2)-(3a) (1994).
187. K.C., 513 N.W.2d at 23. This is the typical rationale given for punishing
children differently than adults. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
188. KC., 513 N.W.2d at 23.
189. Id.
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willing to accept the notion of the juvenile court as a munificent,
treatment-oriented institution. Even under Minnesota's height-
ened rational basis analysis, an equal protection challenge to these
statutory changes may not succeed.
B. The Due Process Balancing Test
While a traditional rational basis analysis may not effectively
defeat these legislative changes, when procedural rights for chil-
dren are at issue, the courts often use a hybrid analysis incorporat-
ing both due process and equal protection concerns.190 This
combined analysis involves a balancing test, whereby the courts
weigh the right asserted against the effect granting the right will
have on the juvenile court system.191 Through this balancing test,
the court determines whether the child must be granted the same
procedural due process as an adult. 192
First, the right itself must be analyzed. As discussed previ-
ously, there is no fundamental right at issue.193 Counsel is only
mandated when actual incarceration will occur,194 or, under Min-
nesota law, when the statute authorizes incarceration for that of-
fense.' 95 Under these new statutes, juveniles cannot receive
sentences which involve out-of-home placement,196 and, therefore,
the fundamental constitutional right to counsel is not at issue.
Even though the right is not fundamental per se, courts may scruti-
nize the right more carefully by looking to its underlying function.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,197 where the child's right to a
jury was at issue, the Supreme Court looked at the underlying func-
tion the right was meant to serve.198 The Court analyzed the un-
derlying function of a jury,199 and concluded that a jury's main




193. See supra notes 142-45, 155 and accompanying text (concluding that this
right is not fundamental).
194. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing the federal limits
on the right to counsel).
195. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (describing the right to counsel
for Minnesota adult defendants).
196. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 34, § 260.195(3), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1184. There may be a possibility of out-of-home placement if the child is
charged with a petty offense for which enhanced penalties are available. See supra
notes 105-07 and accompanying text (describing the possibility of enhanced
penalties).
197. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
198. Id. at 547.
199. Id. at 543.
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function was to serve as a fact-finder for the case. 200 In many situa-
tions, judges also serve as the fact-finder.2O1 The Court went on to
discuss the effect of injecting the jury system into juvenile
courts, 2 0 2 concluding that the jury trial would "remake the juvenile
proceedings into a fully adversary process," and end the "idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding."203 Bal-
ancing what it saw as an extremely negative effect on the informal-
ity of the juvenile courts with the conclusion that a judge can serve
as fact-finder as well as a jury, the Court concluded that children
neither have nor need the right to a jury trial.204
The new statutory amendments involve whether the right to
counsel, and the function served, is different. The attorney serves
as the legal advisor for the defendant as well as the protector of the
defendant's legal rights. Within the juvenile court system, no other
court worker can perform this function as effectively.205 The
county attorney represents the legal interests of the state and the
judge serves as fact-finder, but only counsel for the accused can pro-
vide true legal advocacy. 206 Therefore, not only is the right of legal
representation important, but it can only be effectuated by an
attorney.
The right granted to adults in similar cases provides that the
criminal defendant can request counsel and the court can provide
counsel when justice so requires. 207 The court has discretion to ap-
point counsel when necessary.20s For example, if the defendant
seems especially vulnerable, the case seems complex, or if the
processing of the case seems questionable, the judge can appoint an
attorney for the defendant.209 Making the child's right equal to the
adult's right requires only that: return the discretion to the juvenile




202. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1971).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 547. The Court went on to say that there is nothing to stop a juvenile
court judge from using a jury when there is a need. Id. at 548.
205. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) ("Whether it is a minor
or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom society as a
whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the
police and the courts.").
206. See, e.g., id. at 720-21 (concluding that a child's probation officer could not
represent that child's legal interests).
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If Judge Christian would have had this power, he could have
successfully appointed counsel for R.M.H., the fifteen-year-old girl
arrested for curfew and alcohol violations. 2 1o In the case of Allison,
our hypothetical thirteen-year-old, when the judge realized that she
was unsure of the offense charged, the judge could have appointed
counsel to help her figure it out. This is the right currently denied
to juvenile petty offenders.
Now that the right has been analyzed, the effect that this right
will have on the juvenile court system must be considered. 2 11
When applying this prong of the test, courts emphasize that the
juvenile court system is meant to be an informal and individualized
institution, and they analyze the effect that such a right would have
on these components of the system.2 12 Granting courts the right to
appoint counsel when the child defendant makes a request does not
negatively affect the juvenile court's informality or its individual-
ized case processing. Since the landmark decision in In re Gault,
lawyers are supposed to be in the juvenile courts. 2 13 Even under
the new statutory regime, lawyers will appear in juvenile courts on
behalf of children charged with acts of delinquency and children pe-
titioned in need of protection and services. 2 14 It is only juvenile
petty offenders who will come to court without an attorney.2 15 Pro-
viding counsel for this one group of children will not significantly
affect the informality of the Minnesota juvenile courts.
In addition, providing counsel for juvenile petty offenders will
have little or no effect on the individualized treatment juveniles are
supposed to receive. Despite the presence of counsel, there will still
be social workers, school workers, and social history reports, all of
which can be considered in sentencing the youth.2 16 The presence
of counsel will only guarantee that juvenile petty offenders will
210. See Petition for Writ of Prohibition at 1, In re R.M.H. (3d Minn. Cir. Aug. 22,
1995) (No. J2-95-50352) (giving the facts of the case which became the court chal-
lenge to these statutory changes), writ granted.
211. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text (describing the balancing test
and its application).
212. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (examining the
effect of a jury trial on "the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal, protective
proceeding"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970) (concluding that the re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not affect individualized
treatment).
213. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
214. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 25, § 260.155(2), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1180. In fact, for the same offense, the county attorney has the discretion to
petition the child as a petty offender or as a child in need of protection and services.
See supra note 101 (explaining the effect of the county attorney's choice).
215. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 25, § 260.155(2), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1180.
216. MnqN. R. Juv. P. 30.03.
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have an advocate who can explain their legal rights to them and
protect them from arbitrary decision-making.217
If this were the end of the analysis, it seems clear that at least
some juvenile petty offenders should be given the right to counsel.
The right is an important one, and conferring this right would have
a minimal effect on the system. This is not the end of the analysis,
though, as the fiscal restraints on the public defender system
remain.
If the public defender system must represent all children with-
out a substantial increase in funding, services to all indigent de-
fendants, adults and children alike, will suffer.218 This is
unacceptable. If, however, juvenile petty offenders are granted the
same right to counsel as that which is granted to adult misdemean-
ants, the burden on the public defender's office will be minimal,219
while the protection granted to juvenile petty offenders who truly
need legal representation may be substantial. With a change in the
legislation creating parity between the two systems, the legislature
can grant this important right to children on a case-by-case basis
without a significant effect on the juvenile court system.
Under the balancing test, the differential treatment between
children and adults cannot stand. While the right to counsel in
these cases may not be fundamental per se, the underlying function
served by the right is an important one that can only be effectuated
by the presence of an attorney. An attorney's presence will not de-
tract from the informality of the current juvenile system or nega-
tively affect individualized sentencing of the child defendant.
Admittedly, the current fiscal restraints on the public defender sys-
tem are overwhelming, but parity between the adult's right and the
child's right can be created without a substantial strain on the
state's resources. Parity only requires that the juvenile court judge
217. The Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System recognized the important
functions that defense counsel should fulfill. TASK FORCE, supra note 65, at 48. De-
fense counsel should "ensure that the adjudication process is fair and valid" and that
counsel "presents dispositional alternatives to the court." Id. In addition, adequate
defense counsel must help the child defendant and her or his parents or guardians
obtain a "better understanding of the juvenile court process." Id. at 49.
218. Interview with John Stuart, supra note 80. See also supra note 79 and ac-
companying text (discussing the overburdened public defender system).
219. It is difficult, if not impossible, to come up with a precise figure for the cost of
public defender services. In the past, public defender services for children have been
funded on a local level. JUVENmE REPRESENTATION, supra note 58, at 23. Each
county or district may keep track of these expenditures in a different way. Id. Be-
cause of this, it is difficult to find the figures that apply only to juvenile defense. Id.
The Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System had similar problems. TASK FORCE,
supra note 65, at 50. However, since parity of procedural rights only requires that
the judge have the power to appoint counsel when necessary or when requested, any
increase in caseload should be minimal.
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have discretion to appoint counsel for petty offenders when the de-
fendant requests counsel or when it is necessary as a matter of jus-
tice. These new statutes should fail under the balancing test.
Further, allowing juvenile court judges to appoint counsel on a
case-by-case basis is consistent with the Supreme Court decisions
that require this approach in quasi-criminal proceedings. 22o If a
court determines that a specific child in a specific case needs coun-
sel based on the requirement of fundamental fairness, 221 that court
must provide an attorney for that defendant so as not to violate the
child's due process rights. As scholars have pointed out, "even
when determined on a case-by-case basis, an indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel is of constitutional significance when it
attaches."222
C. Policy Concerns
Even without a new court challenge against the statutes, the
Minnesota legislature has a duty to reexamine the statutory
changes and the policy issues they raise, examining any benefits
that these statutes provide to children and retaining those benefits.
In addition, the legislature should look at the effect on children of
diminished procedural protections. As Representative Macklin ob-
served during committee hearings, these statutes implemented a
substantial policy change with minimal legislative discussion of the
issues involved.223 While this is probably true of many statutory
changes that take place, these statutes were never even addressed
by the entire Judiciary Committee. 224 Some discussion of the pol-
icy issues involving children's right to counsel is necessary for a re-
examination of the 1995 amendments.
1. The Benefit of Decriminalization
Despite the many negative aspects of the statutory amend-
ments, there is at least one component benefitting children in the
juvenile court system. Under the 1995 amendments, petty offenses
are decriminalized, reducing the severity of sentencing options and
220. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (describing the right to counsel
in quasi-criminal contexts).
221. This is also the measurement of due process in the juvenile court context.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
222. Catz & Firak, supra note 143, at 439.
223. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (describing this objection to
the way in which the statutory changes were introduced).
224. Id.
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the stigma attached to such offenses.225 When children are brought
into court for petty offenses, they can no longer be placed outside
the home.226 Previously, the sentencing options available to judges
for such minor transgressions were almost limitless. 227 The judge
was to impose an individualized sentence based on the offender
rather than on the severity of the offense. 228 Under the old system,
a child could be placed in a group home, a training school, or any
other form of inpatient treatment for one of these minor offenses.229
In addition, under the new scheme, juvenile petty offenders
are no longer labeled as delinquents for these minor infractions.230
Under the 1995 amendments, a child must be found guilty of a
petty offense at least three times before the court can label that
child delinquent or place that child outside the home. 231 One of the
225. The Juvenile Representation Study Committee also recommended that mi-
nor offenses be decriminalized: "A significant amount of time, effort, and money
could be saved if... minor cases were decriminalized, eliminating the need for ap-
pointment of counsel and the presence of the prosecutor." JuvENME REPRESENTA-
TION, supra note 58, at 26.
226. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 34, § 260.195(3), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1184. Out-of-home placement may be possible if enhanced penalties are avail-
able. See supra notes 105-07 (explaining the use of enhanced penalties).
227. Although a list of dispositions was delineated, a catch-all existed giving the
judge substantial discretion. MNN. STAT. § 260.195(3)(f) (1994). The judge could re-
quire the child to "perform any other activities or participate in any other treatment
programs deemed appropriate by the court." Id. This catch-all is still included in
the new statutes, only treatment programs have been limited to outpatient settings,
at least for the initial charge. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 34(3)(g),
§ 260.195(3), 1995 Minn. Laws 1184. Now, the judge can merely require the child to
"perform any other activities or participate in any other outpatient treatment pro-
grams deemed appropriate by the court." Id. (emphasis added).
228. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing the negative effects of
maintaining an individualized system).
229. Mu-N. STAT. § 260.195(3).
230. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.015(21)(c), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1806. These statutes, however, do not completely deinstitutionalize the social
controls over children charged with petty offenses. After all, these children are still
being brought into the system. While the initial dispositions cannot include out-of-
home placement, in certain circumstances, the penalties that remain can be severe.
A $100 fine for a young child may be excessive. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226,
art. 3, sec. 34(3)(a), § 260.195(3), 1995 Minn. Laws 1184. Six-months' probation can
be very restrictive given the intrusiveness of the probation system. Id. at sec.
34(3)(d); see also Brief of Arnicus Curiae Fourth District Public Defender at 11, In re
R.H. (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (No. C2-95-1793) (arguing that probation is a substantial
restriction on liberty). Because these penalties can be quite severe to certain youth,
the complete absence of counsel is not justified merely by taking away the option of
out-of-home placement.
231. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, sec. 15, § 260.015(21)(b)(1), 1995
Minn. Laws 1806. But see supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (explaining
the possibility of more severe penalties when alcohol or other drugs are involved).
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many problems with pulling children into the system unnecessarily
is the stigma associated with being labeled delinquent.232
Of course, it would be worse if these children could be incar-
cerated for such petty offenses. To protect children from excessive
punishment and to limit the discretion of the juvenile court judge,
the legislature should retain reduced sentencing options. When the
legislature reexamines the statutory changes it has implemented, it
must consider the benefit of such reduced sentences and the advan-
tage of placing limits on the sentences that judges are allowed to
give to children.233 In addition to discussing these benefits, the
legislators should also discuss any negative effects this new system
will have on children charged as petty offenders.
2. The Disadvantage of a Lower Standard
The 1995 statutory amendments give children less procedural
safeguards than adults. This type of disparate treatment can sig-
nificantly influence the child's view of the entire justice system.
Children know what a justice system should look like.23 4 Upon fac-
232. BORTNER, supra note 18, at 9-10. It is not only the label, though, that causes
the stigmatization. Id. The mere fact of having to go to court is stigmatizing. Id.
Probation, community service, or outpatient counseling can further stigmatize
youth. Id. Thus, participation in the juvenile court system in and of itself can stig-
matize a child. Id.
The delinquent label can also have profound effects on a child's future. Adult
courts can now use juvenile delinquency offenses in determining an adult defend-
ant's sentence for an adult crime. MWN. SENTENCING GUIDELNES, Guideline II.B,
MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has approved this use of
juvenile records. State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). Under
this scheme, only juvenile felony-level offenses can be used in adult sentencing, but
"prior adjudications [for petty offenses] directly affect juvenile sentencing" in the
first instance. David Dormont, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences,
75 MINN. L. REv. 1769, 1800 (1991).
233. The legislature is already moving toward giving juvenile court judges less
discretion in sentencing. See Judicial District Delinquency Disposition Principles,
1994 Minn. Laws 567 § 59 (requiring judges to publish written criteria for use in all
juvenile delinquency sentencing). Some states have gone even further and have sen-
tencing guidelines in place for children as well as adults. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.40.030 (West 1995) (containing the juvenile sentencing guidelines).
One scholar has argued that limiting juvenile court discretion in this way will
eradicate unequal application of the juvenile law and promote accountability among
beth juvenile court judges and children who commit crimes. Ralph A. Rossum, Hold-
ing Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's 'Juvenile Injustice System," 22
PEPP. L. REv. 907, 925-26 (1995). Another commentator has rejected this movement
and concluded that the discretionary treatment-oriented model is more effective.
Jeffrey K Day, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of Reha-
bilitation, 16 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 399, 459-60 (1992).
234. Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1119. One juvenile court judge concluded that
because of their past experiences, children who come before the court possess a "ma-
turity which is normally acquired much later in life. They are generally well aware
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ing the juvenile system, however, many children are surprised at
what they find. Courtroom procedures are relaxed, the courtrooms
themselves are often small and informal, 235 and now, in Minnesota,
juvenile petty offenders will discover that they do not have the right
to an attorney as they may have expected.
Many scholars have concluded that such informality in the ju-
venile court creates in children a great disrespect for the system. 2 3 6
Rather than legitimizing social norms, the apparently arbitrary en-
forcement of "law" in the juvenile courtroom reinforces the belief
that adults are just "out to get them."237 Children come to believe
that justice is not for them as they face what the United States
Supreme Court has called a "kangaroo court,"238 a mere illusion of
justice. Allison, our hypothetical thirteen-year-old, could be coerced
into pleading guilty to a charge of which she has no knowledge, and
be punished accordingly. Under the new statutory amendments,
she could face a substantial fine, several hours of community ser-
vice, or extensive outpatient treatment.23 9 Such treatment would
certainly not teach her that the justice system is fair, or that courts,
judges, and the law are to be respected.
Juvenile court workers who continue to believe that the juve-
nile system's main goal is rehabilitation have stated that disrespect
for the system can inhibit rehabilitation:
"The child who feels that he has been dealt with fairly and not
merely expediently or as speedily as possible will be a better
prospect for rehabilitation.... Thus, a general societal attitude
of acceptance of the juvenile as a person entitled to the same
protection as an adult may be the true beginning of the rehabil-
itative process."2 40
of their rights in a court of law." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 569 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
235. To confirm this point, one need only spend a day observing the juvenile court.
One scholar recommends that "[first-hand observation of courthouse activities is es-
sential" for a true understanding of the juvenile court system. BORTNER, supra note
18, at 18.
236. Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1119-21.
237. Ainsworth concludes that I[als a consequence of this loss of legitimacy of thejuvenile court, the process of legal socialization for a large segment of our youth has
broken down." Id. at 1121. She defines legal socialization as "the inculcation of a
society's approved norms and values regarding the law," and concludes that this is a
.primary mechanism of social control." Id.
238. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) ("Under our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.").
239. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, see. 34, § 260.195(3), 1995 Minn.
Laws 1184.
240. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 562 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
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By making the courtroom even more informal through the absence
of defense counsel, disrespect for the system will be reinforced.241
This is an important policy matter that the legislature should con-
sider when reexamining these statutory changes denying juvenile
petty offenders the right to counsel.
Perhaps even more important, the Minnesota legislature
should have a serious discussion as to the validity of maintaining a
segregated court system for children. As societal notions of child-
hood are changing,242 it is time to reexamine our concept of chil-
dren and the necessity for differential treatment between children
and adults.
Preferably, these policy discussions should take place not only
in committee hearings, but in public forums. The legislature has
had to formally implement a triage system in the juvenile court sys-
tem.2 43 The more serious cases are being sent to adult court, and,
under these statutory amendments, the less serious cases are being
tried without due process protection for the defendant. 244 Only the
children in the middle are receiving the procedural safeguards they
deserve in the juvenile system. This is a serious policy decision, one
about which the public should be informed.
M. A Call for Equality
At the very minimum, juvenile petty offenders should be
granted the same right to counsel that adults possess. The child
defendant's right should parallel the adult defendant's right and ju-
venile court judges should have the power to appoint counsel to in-
digent children in any case where legal representation would be
beneficial. Further, the legislature should require that the court
appoint a public defender any time a child requests an attorney.
Childhood is a social construct which has changed and evolved
over time, with little basis in biology or reality.245 In other words,
241. Further, under the new statutory regime, if a juvenile fails to comply with a
court order given for a petty offense, the court has little authority to respond. By
statute, a juvenile cannot be found delinquent or be incarcerated solely for violating
a court order given for a non-delinquent offense. MNN. STAT. § 260.301 (1994).
Therefore, if the juvenile wishes not to comply with such a court order, the court has
little authority to enforce its own sentence. This lack of authority exacerbates disre-
spect for the juvenile justice system.
242. For a thorough discussion of our changing conceptions of childhood, along
with a compelling argument advocating the abolition of a separate juvenile court
system, see Ainsworth, supra note 23.
243. Interview with John Stuart, supra note 80.
244. Id.
245. See Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1085-1103 (discussing the evolution of the
social construct of childhood); Prajna Das Gupta, Images of Childhood and Theories
of Development, in Tin FOUNnATIONS OF Cmw DEVELOPMFNT 1, 6-12 (John Oates
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if children are less competent and less capable than adults, it is
because society has constructed them that way, and not due to any
inherent incompetency. 24 6 Even a social construct by itself can be a
powerful motivator, molding children's behavior.247 If one treats a
child as inferior and incapable, that child will usually respond ac-
cordingly. If, on the other hand, one treats a child as a competent
human being, that child will usually act as a competent human be-
ing.2 48 The way in which society views children ultimately deter-
mines how the court system treats children.249
ed., 1994) (chronicling briefly the changing historical images of childhood); William
Kessen, Appendix: The American Child and Other Cultural Inventions, in THE CHILD
AND OTHER CULTURAL INVENTIONS 261, 262 (Frank S. Kessel et al. eds., 1981) ("[Tlhe
child is essentially and eternally a cultural invention.").
246. See Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1091 (concluding that "[s]ocial definitions of
reality" determine our treatment of biological attributes); Kessen, supra note 245, at
262 ("[C]hildren [are] shaped and marked by the larger cultural forces.") (emphasis
omitted).
247. One scholar explains:
Mother knows what a two-year-old is like and father does and the gro-
cery man and the laundryman and the teacher and the policeman.
Wherever the child goes, he gets a clear and congruent image of what
he is supposed to be like and, perhaps not surprisingly, he takes it on
rather easily.
William Kessen, The Child and Other Cultural Inventions, in THE CHILD AND OTHER
CULTURAL INVENTIONS 26, 35 (Frank S. Kessel et al. eds., 1981).
Social construction may affect even biological attributes. See ROSEMARIE TONG,
FEMINIST THOUGHT 127-28 (1989) (explaining Alison Jaggar's theory that environ-
mental forces can change biology). See also MARTHA MiNow, MAKING ALL THE DEF-
FERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERiCAN LAw 174 (1990) (describing labeling
theory and the implications of being labeled by society as different or marginal).
248. There are numerous examples of children proving their competence. For ex-
ample, in 1993, the Minnesota Attorney General created the Youth Task Force on
Juvenile Justice. MINNESOTA ATrORNEY GENERAL'S YOUTH TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE, REPORT 1 (1994). The Task Force consisted of nine high school students
who travelled around the state to conduct public hearings with other high school
students. Id. The Task Force came up with substantial recommendations for the
state's juvenile courts. For example, they recommended that Minnesota create bet-
ter intervention programs for young children, and that the legislature rewrite the
juvenile laws in "plain English." Id. at 6. Further, the high school students through-
out the state made compelling and thoughtful statements. One Rochester student
wrote on the importance of relationships to prevention: "Programs alone are not the
solution. They are an impersonal way to deal with a personal problem.... Relation-
ships are the key to both prevention and intervention." Id. at 28. This type of com-
petence is not out of the norm for children when treated respectfully.
Some scholars have criticized basing rights on capacity or competence alto-
gether. See, e.g., MiNow, supra note 247, at 146-47 (criticizing rights analysis for
ignoring differences as defined by society); Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to
Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle,
42 DEPAL L. REv. 983 (1993) (criticizing the use of capacity as a prerequisite to
rights for children).
249. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1101 ("[Tlhe social construction of ado-
lescence as a species of childhood powerfully informed the ideology and practice of
the parens patriae juvenile court.").
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Unfortunately, the idea that children are people is not popu-
lar.2 50 Many adults do believe that children are less competent and
less capable. If this is true, then there is an even greater need for
children to have legal protection when facing any charge before the
court,25 1 whether charged with a petty offense or a delinquent act.
Perhaps there is a middle ground between these two positions.
Even if one accepts the proposition that children are incompetent,
in general, once a child has committed an adult crime, one has to
accept that the child is capable of committing an adult act. The
question remains whether this child should face the same conse-
quences that an adult would. 252 As a society, we have already de-
cided that children who commit these acts should have to face the
juvenile court, a system that is becoming increasingly more puni-
tive.25 3 If we are going to force that child, a person capable of com-
mitting an adult act, to face such a punitive court system, the
courts should afford that child the same rights as an adult.
While the legislature should remove the disparity that these
statutory amendments created, it should retain the benefits
granted to children by the statutes. The move toward decriminal-
ization of petty offenses was a positive change. Many of these of-
fenses truly are petty. One scholar has even referred to this type of
juvenile behavior as nothing more than "noise making, apple swip-
ing, and window breaking."254 No one should be incarcerated for
such petty actions. Even if the legislature were to repeal in toto the
statutory changes made to children's right to counsel in 1995, the
reduced sentences available should remain. Indeed, if the legisla-
ture resurrects the old sentencing options, it must guarantee that
an attorney is available for every case, as Minnesota law requires
the right to counsel any time the statute authorizes incarcera-
250. Hopefully, new psychological studies will change society's view of children.
These studies are showing that the "binary opposition between child and adult" is
breaking down, and perhaps soon the social construct of childhood will change again.
Ainsworth, supra note 23, at 1103. This breakdown can be seen in the increasing
presence of automatic waiver statutes in juvenile court proceedings. Id. at 1112.
These statutes provide that for certain named offenses a child will automatically be
tried as an adult, thereby rejecting the view of" 'child' and 'adult' as mutually exclu-
sive." Id.
251. For a similar argument, see In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1971)
(granting children the right to appeal because they need more protection).
252. This question has been with American law for some time, starting even
before the creation of a segregated court system. In nineteenth century America,
judicial sentences gave special allowances to children for their youthfulness. PLATr,
supra note 15, at 101.
253. See supra note 170-73 and accompanying text (explaining the growing puni-
tive purposes of juvenile courts).
254. RoTHmAN, supra note 17, at 250.
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tion.255 Further, if resources are too limited to provide counsel to
all children, then resources are too limited to pay for the incarcera-
tion of these youth.
Conclusion
In 1994, the Minnesota legislature responded to the absence of
legal representation for children by enacting progressive legislation
granting children not only the right to counsel but a guarantee that
they would actually see an attorney before they went to court.
While this legislation was overwhelmingly accepted, Governor
Carlson vetoed the additional funding that the public defender of-
fices needed to meet the new requirements of legal representation
for children. In response, the 1995 Minnesota legislature amended
a group of statutes, thereby creating the juvenile petty offender cat-
egory and denying counsel to all children charged with one of these
offenses. This created a different standard for children than that
which is required for adults.
Under equal protection and due process analyses, this differ-
ential treatment will fail. Juvenile judges must at least have the
discretion to appoint counsel for children in every case when the
child requests an attorney or where the judge determines that the
accused should have legal representation. This is the same right
granted to Minnesota adult misdemeanants. In addition, the legis-
lature should retain the reduced sentences for juvenile petty offend-
ers. If children are going to accept the mandates of our legal system
as just, they need to experience the system as one that treats them
as equal people under the law.
255. MIN. R. CaM. P. 5.02. Of course, a child defendant would still be able to
waive this right. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (describing the
problems with waiver in juvenile court).
Alternatively, Minnesota could revert to the minimum requirements of Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 368 (1979). This approach, however, would be a significant
step backward for Minnesota, and should be rejected. See supra note 51 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Scott standard and its numerous problems).
[Vol. 14:647
